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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
REFORMING THE TAX CODE: A TALE OF TWO PURPOSES 
AND PARALYSIS 
Gene Magidenko* 
Though the presidential election of 2012 is still some time 
away, national politics have been in the thick of one for several 
months now. One of the top issues being debated is the tax code.1 
Most agree that the tax code should be simplified, but to say that 
the proposals to do this are various is an understatement. This 
perennial question of reform has been a fixture of the national 
debate for a long time, so little of what can be said about it is 
particularly novel. All the same, a brief overview of the purposes 
behind our system of taxation and how they inform the present 
debate about tax reform is useful. The ultimate conclusion, 
unsatisfying as it may be, is that there are serious systemic 
obstacles to any substantive changes to the tax code. 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Until the early twentieth century, states were responsible for 
imposing most of the tax burden on Americans. The federal 
government primarily relied on tariffs and excise taxes and 
resorted only temporarily to income taxation during the Civil 
War.2 During the Progressive Era in the early twentieth century, 
federal taxation achieved a new prominence that soon eclipsed 
that of the states. Following the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913, income taxation expanded prodigiously. 
Presently, the federal government imposes most of the burden on 
                                                   
*  J.D. Candidate, December 2012, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. See, e.g., Nina Easton, It’s Time for an Honest Tax Debate, TERM SHEET (Jan. 25, 
2012, 12:25 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/25/obama-tax-debate/. 
2. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era 
Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1793, 1803-04 (2005).  
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taxpayers—and specifically on their incomes.3  
The history of federal income taxation suggests that two 
primary and occasionally conflicting schools of thought prompted 
the imposition of income tax. The first was born of a desire to 
raise revenue for the essential functions of government.4 The 
government by its very nature must have some expenditures (the 
extent and allocation of expenditures, of course, is a constant 
source of contention) to fulfill its core constitutional functions of 
providing for the national defense, regulating commerce, coining 
money, maintaining a postal system, maintaining federal courts, 
controlling federal lands, etc.5 There are a variety of ways in 
which the federal government could theoretically raise the funds 
to accomplish these functions. Among the various potential 
mechanisms are tariffs, excise taxes, consumption/sales taxes (e.g., 
a value-added tax), wealth taxes, property taxes, and income taxes. 
The choice of imposing income taxation may seem odd at first 
glance, because it is more difficult to collect and enforce at the 
national level than other taxes. But there are two reasons why 
income taxation is particularly attractive to a federal government 
that is constantly growing in size and scope (and the goal of 
which—frequently at odds with that of taxpayers—becomes to 
maximize tax revenues), notwithstanding administrative 
difficulties. First, such a tax creates a large tax base: a lot of people 
earn a lot of money. And second, an income tax allows the 
government to tax a single stream of wealth multiple times as it 
circulates through the economy. For example, a worker receives a 
sum of money, on which he is taxed, and which he spends in a 
store on various goods. The shopkeeper then spends the money 
(on which he in turn is taxed) on books. The bookstore owner too 
is taxed on that income, which he uses to buy a car. And so on. 
The second and more recent school of thought behind a 
                                                   
3. Compare Tax Foundation, Selected Federal Rates, 2012, TAX DATA (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/28015.html, with Tax Foundation, State 
Individual Income Tax Rates, 2000–2012, TAX DATA (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.TaxFoundation.org/ taxdata/show/228.html. See also Kail M. Padgitt, Tax 
Freedom Day Arrives on April 12, TAX FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 2011, at 6 
(Figure 2), available at http://www.TaxFoundation.org/files/sr190.pdf.  
4. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role 
of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2005) 
(“Taxes are used to raise revenue to fund government services .…”).  
5. See U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8.  
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graduated income tax is wealth redistribution.6 The conscious 
allocation of wealth is a means by which the government can fund 
programs that disproportionately benefit only certain 
constituencies, an inevitable result in a pluralistic representative 
democracy. This is the primary factor differentiating the “wealth 
redistribution” purpose from the essential revenue-raising 
function of government noted in the previous paragraph. The 
latter, as originally envisioned, exists to fund the quintessential 
public goods—those from which all in society benefit relatively 
equally—and relies only on raising sufficient funds to cover those 
core functions. Wealth redistribution funds group-specific 
programs from which only some in society benefit.7 The 
unlimited demand of various constituencies invariably means that 
the government seeks expansion of the supply of government 
services, whether core or otherwise. Additionally, the Progressive 
Era variant of this idea suggests that large accumulations of 
wealth in the hands of any given individual are undesirable.8 
There is a persistent preoccupation with wealth disparities. In an 
economy that is not planned top-down, the way to level incomes is 
to more-than-proportionally reduce the earnings of the more 
affluent by taxing their income directly. Whether this raises more 
revenue is not necessarily considered a relevant question.9  
THE MODERN DEBATE 
Viewing the modern debate over tax reform through the lens 
of these two competing ideas is particularly informative. It is 
                                                   
6. See Bird & Zolt, supra note 4, at 1630, 1670 (“Countries also use taxes (and 
expenditures) to change the distribution of income or wealth.”). 
7. Some may counter that a redistribution program, like a safety net for example, 
disincentivizes over-saving and frees up assets to go to productive use. However, it is 
debatable whether disincentivizing over-saving is a public good. Indeed, higher savings 
rates can actually lead to greater and cheaper loan availability (assuming people save 
money in banks). This allows entrepreneurs to start more businesses and create additional 
wealth.  
8. The idea is that there is supposedly greater social stability that comes with greater 
wealth redistribution. This is almost certainly not a public good. The putative recipients of 
redistributed wealth are either no worse off than they were before (if they get nothing) or 
are better off (if they receive money or benefits). On the other hand, those from whom 
money is taken for distribution are worse off in both scenarios (they either have to pay or 
face riots). In that sense, the argument for wealth redistribution as a means of alleviating 
social tensions is essentially extortive.  
9. See, e.g., David Callahan, Occupy the Tax Code, THE GREAT DEBATE (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2011/12/13/occupy-the-tax-code/ (arguing that 
increasing taxes on the wealthy is necessary to reduce income inequality).  
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rarely a question of entirely eliminating one of the two purposes. 
Any system of taxation inherently raises some revenue and 
allocates wealth. The question is whether the redistribution of 
wealth is a conscious goal of the system, and if so, to what end. 
Our current system explicitly adopts the wealth-redistribution 
purpose.10 This purpose was particularly salient from the 1930s 
through the end of the 1970s. The 1980s saw a slight retreat,11 one 
that lasted with greater or lesser success through 2008, when the 
ongoing economic crisis hit. 
Even with the tax debate as excited as ever, it is not realistic to 
expect any radical changes to the tax code. Although everyone 
seems to agree that the code must be “simplified”–and the 
meaning of simplification of course varies considerably–the two 
competing purposes will tend to reinforce the present status quo. 
Government expenditures are addictive.  Just as voters strongly 
dislike Congress12 but tend to like their congressional 
representative,13 so too do most resent a large federal government 
but hesitate to make substantive cuts. Specific reductions in 
expenditures are met with fierce resistance by those who benefit 
from them, whereas the push for tax reform is a very general and 
diffuse one. The tax code causes someone to lose and someone to 
win, but no one is ever entirely a loser, because there still remain 
certain public goods that benefit all taxpayers. 
This ratchet makes it easier to increase government spending 
than it does to reduce it, meaning that there is also a constant 
upward pressure on revenues that have to be raised to cover those 
expenses. Because the government does not ordinarily create 
wealth, it must rely on two vehicles for funding its operations: 
                                                   
10. Wealth redistribution must to a degree be tied with raising revenue, insofar as 
distributing wealth to someone requires taking it from someone else through taxation. 
However, because one of the goals of redistribution is not necessarily to raise revenue but 
to reduce top incomes, it is not always aligned with efficient revenue-expenditure processes. 
This makes it at odds with the pure revenue-raising function of taxation.  
11.  See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
12. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Congress’ Job Approval at New Low of 10%, GALLUP 
POLITICS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/152528/congress-job-approval-new-
low.aspx (noting that 86% of Americans disapprove of congressional job performance).  
13. In a September 2010 poll, for example, Congressman John Dingell, whose district 
includes Ann Arbor, MI, was viewed favorably by 48.3% of his constituents. See Ryan J. 
Stanton, Latest Poll Shows John Dingell More Popular in Washtenaw County than Other 
Parts of District, ANNARBOR.COM (Sep. 20, 2010, 7:24 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/la 
test-poll-shows-john-dingell-more-popular-in-washtenaw-county-than-other-parts-of-district/.  
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taxation and debt. Taxation is the direct and traditional way to 
fund expenditures. The government collects tax and then 
redirects it to its targets. Debt is in principle a stopgap for 
situations where expenditures exceed revenues. The past several 
years have seen skyrocketing government expenditures but 
relatively static tax revenues,14 leading to a higher proportion of 
debt. The general sentiment is that running deficits is 
undesirable.15 Barring substantive reductions in expenditures, this 
will tend to lead to a stronger push for raising revenues–through 
taxation. 
WHITHER NOW? 
Tax reform is ultimately a political question, and the answer 
will not come from within tax law. The law can only provide a tool 
for creating and maintaining a system of taxation.  The purposes 
and priorities are a policy matter. The complexity of the present 
system reinforces a longstanding policy of wealth redistribution, 
where all constituencies disproportionately benefit from some 
aspects, even while many of these constituencies also 
disproportionately lose from other aspects. This makes coalition 
building to simplify the tax code difficult, as there is a collective 
action problem in attempting to seriously do so. Because the 
system is much more welcoming of gradualism, it is easier for 
specific constituencies to push for specific redistributive policies 
and ratchet up the tax code’s complexity. In the end, tax lawyers 
can breathe easier, knowing that they will not be out of a job any 
time soon.   
                                                   
14.  The Heritage Foundation, Federal Spending Is Growing Faster than Federal 
Revenue (Chart), 2011 BUDGET CHART BOOK, 
http://www.heritage.org/budgetchartbook/growth-federal-spending-revenue (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2012). 
15. But see, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Sometimes Good to Run Budget Deficits? If 
So, Should We Admit It (Out Loud)?, 26 VA. TAX REV. 325, 326 (2006) (“The belief that it is 
unquestionably foolish to adopt policies that directly or indirectly increase the 
government’s annual borrowing on the financial markets—which is what it means to run a 
budget deficit—is not the universal truth that the current conventional wisdom might 
imply.”).  
